Stay Tuned..

OPLAN 1019 Arabian Gauntlet
The Strait Of Hormuz is the world’s second busiest international strait. The key to the Central Command area is to maintain uninterrupted access to energy resources. The Persian Gulf region contains roughly 68% of the world's known oil and natural gas reserves. Nearly 25% of the world’s oil supply flows through the Strait of Hormuz on a daily basis. Over 75% of Japan's oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz account for roughly two-fifths of all world traded oil. The Energy Information Administration projects that oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz will double from approximately 15 million barrels of oil in 2005 to 30-34 million barrels per day by 2020, suggesting that ensuring the free flow of oil through the Strait will continue to be an important mission.

The Iranians have repeatedly threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz if the rest of the world does not do what Iran wishes it to do in a variety of ways. There was such a threat in May 1997, with the Iranians saying that if the Americans were to try to take any kind of retaliatory action against Iranian terrorism, they would close this Strait of Hormuz. During a 18 December 1997 press conference, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Maleki stated that Iran supports "the free flow of oil" through the Strait of Hormuz, but reserved the option of closing off the shipping route if it is threatened. Iran ad recently has admitted to deploying anti- aircraft and anti- ship missiles on Abu Musa, an island strategically located near the Strait of Hormuz’s shipping lanes. Some say it would be foolish for Iran to seek to disrupt oil traffic in the Gulf because all of its oil flows through the Gulf. The US Government doesn't anticipate that Iran would try to do something like that because it would be the first victim of any such program.

If access to the Gulf were denied, assuming pipelines would flow at maximum capacity, the world would lose 17% of its oil supply. Closure of the Strait of Hormuz would require use of longer alternate routes (if available) at increased transportation costs. Such routes include the 5 million-bbl/d capacity Petroline (East-West Pipeline) and the 290,000-bbl/d Abqaiq-Yanbu natural gas liquids line across Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea. Theoretically, the 1.65-million bbl/d Iraqi Pipeline across Saudi Arabia (IPSA) also could be utilized, more oil could be pumped north to Ceyhan (Turkey), and the 0.5 million-bbl/d Tapline to Lebanon could be reactivated.

The Strait of Hormuz, a narrow waterway separating the Arabian Gulf from the Gulf of Oman and the North Arabian Sea, is only about 40 miles wide, and is 34 miles wide at its narrowest point. By far the world's most important oil chokepoint, the Strait consists of 2-mile wide channels for inbound and outbound tanker traffic, as well as a 2-mile wide buffer zone.

The Persian Gulf is a shallow, semienclosed basin with a mean depth of only 25 to 40 m. The circulation of this basin is driven primarily by the local wind stress and secondarily by thermohaline forcing. The prevailing wind in the Persian Gulf is from the northwest and is called the shamal. A wind-driven generally cyclonic circulation results. The lands surrounding the Persian Gulf are dry so there is strong excess evaporation over the Persian Gulf. This results in a surface inflow of relatively fresh water and an outflow of deeper, more-saline water at the Strait of Hormuz.

The Strait of Hormuz has a very small sill and thus a classic inverse-estuarine circulation dominates the Gulf. Relatively freshwater flows in through the Straits and the more saline water flow uninhibited out of the straits at depth. Some of the highest current speeds are in the inflow through the southern side of the Strait of Hormuz. This inflow feeds the eastward coastal current along the south edge of the Gulf, which is strongest near Qatar. Along the Iranian coast, there is another eastward current where it terminates and its remnant turns south into the interior.

Iran’s rearmament program invited an array of interpretations of its military capability to close or interdict the Strait of Hormuz (SOH). The fighting in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), drove Iran’s military forces down to minimal levels of equipment while increasing institutional disorganization. Air and ground assets ended the war in the poorest condition. Iran chose to rearm these forces first. However, in 1992, the focus widened to include the rebuilding of the Navy and those military assets physically near the Strait of Hormuz.

This enlarged emphasis expanded Iranian military capacity to again challenge shipping transiting the SOH. With its new naval acquisitions, Iran is an increased threat to the interests of its neighbors and the West, particularly the United States. In the mid-1990s Iran began a military buildup on several small gulf islands close to the Strait of Hormuz. They added several thousand additional troops to those islands, artillery, anti-ship missiles and even chemical weapons.

UAE and other Arab Gulf states are seeking to reverse Iran's occupation of three small islands near the Strait of Hormuz: Abu Musa, Greater Tunb Island, and Lesser Tunb Island, all strategically located in the Strait of Hormuz. The three islands were effectively occupied by Iranian troops in 1992. In 1995, the Iranian Foreign Ministry claimed that the islands were "an inseparable part of Iran." Iran rejected a 1996 proposal by the Gulf Cooperation Council for the dispute to be resolved by the International Court of Justice, an option supported by the UAE. On December 31, 2001, the GCC issued a statement reiterating its support for the UAE's sovereignty over Abu Musa and the Tunbs, declared Iran's claims on the islands as "null and void," and backed "all measures...by the UAE to regain sovereignty on its three islands peacefully."

In one possible scenario for an area-denial strategy, Iran might be able to prevent the US Navy from operating in the Persian Gulf by mining the Strait of Hormuz and then guarding it with antiship cruise missiles and small submarines to thwart mine-clearing operations.

Initial reactions to this threat from the United States included an increased military presence, economic sanctions, and continued political rallying against the Islamic Republic. Simultaneously, the Gulf Cooperation Council reacted by implementing efforts to improve military strength through the acquisition of weapons from the United States and others.

A "spiraling effect" arms race is taking place between Iran and the GCC, in which each side attempts to gain military advantage over the other. Unfortunately, the Iranian threat still persists. The growth of the Iranian forces, specifically the navy and those components next to the SOH, have resulted in mixed threat interpretations. Now, the ultimate challenge for decision-makers and strategic planners alike lies in accurately assessing the ability of Iranian forces to attempt to and, if possible, keep the Strait of Hormuz closed.

The US intelligence community judges that Iran can briefly close the Strait of Hormuz, relying on a layered strategy using predominately naval, air, and some ground forces. During 2004 it purchased North Korean torpedo and missile-armed fast attack craft and midget submarines, making marginal improvements to this capability. Tehran's ability to interdict the Strait of Hormuz with air, surface and sub-surface naval units, as well as mines and missiles remains a concern. Additionally, Iran's asymmetrical capabilities are becoming more robust. These capabilities include high-speed attack patrol ships, anti-ship missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and hardened facilities for surface-to-surface missiles and command and control.

In a December 1982 declaration accompanying signature on 1982 LOS Convention, Iran appeared to require prior authorization for warships to enter territorial sea and limited transit passage right in Strait of Hormuz to signatories of 1982 Convention. This requirement is not recognized by the US. The US protested requirement in 1983 and 1987, and conducted operational assertions in 1989 and 1992 of prior permission requirement, and conducted regular transits of the Straits of Hormuz from 1983 through 2000.

The Navy's presence in the Gulf has grown steadily since 1879, when Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt sailed USS Ticonderoga through the Strait of Hormuz, making it the first American man-of-war to visit the Gulf. Because the free flow of trade in the region was threatened as Iran and Iraq staged a "tanker war," a stronger U.S. stance became necessary. Then-President Ronald Reagan approved a request by the Kuwaiti government to reflag a number of tankers under the Stars and Stripes to afford them escort protection through the Strait of Hormuz. Operation Earnest Will proved successful.

Fleet Battle Experiment Foxtrot (FBE-F) FBE Foxtrot [30 Nov - 8 Dec 1999] was shifted from C6F to C5F due to operations in Kosovo and occured 30 November-8 December 1999. Focus areas included Weapons of Mass Destruction and Costal Domanance. Networked combined force required 62% less time to restore mine free shipping in Strait of Hormuz (FBE Foxtrot, Dec 1999). FBE-Foxtrot investigated coordinated joint naval and land fires (including those provided by SOF and U.S. Army Apache helicopters) through an experimental Joint Fires Element. It explored time-critical targeting of a coordinated, multi-layered enemy at a naval chokepoint. The experiment also explored using distributed, collaborative planning to enhance understanding of the undersea environment and operational situation in countermine warfare. A battle management cell for defense against chemical and biological weapons was established to seek improvements in chemical/biological defense readiness and vulnerability assessment, warning and reporting of chem/bio events, and coordination of intra-theater support and initial responses to chemical/biological attacks.

Multinational forces gather to participate in the world's largest mine countermeasures exercise, "Arabian Gauntlet." Arabian Gauntlet is a joint multinational military exercise to maintain the vital sea lines in and out of the Persian Gulf.

The Harry S Truman Battle Group participated in numerous international exercises during 2001, including Arabian Gauntlet, an 11-nation exercise that involved more than 20 ships. Fleet ocean-going tug USNS Catawba conducted a simulated distressed diver drill during the multi-nation operation Arabian Gauntlet 2001. Patrol Squadron 47's "Golden Swordsman" took part in the Arabian Gauntlet exercise in the Persian Gulf. VP-47 combat aircrews flew missions in support of the Arabian Gauntlet exercise, while operating out of Masirah, Oman and the Kingdom of Bahrain. The P-3 Orions of VP-47 participated with ships and aircraft from the British, German, French, Saudi Arabian, Omani, Kuwaiti, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Pakistan and U.S. military forces. The exercise lasted 21 days, with VP-47's P-3s flying both day and night missions for a majority of the exercise's duration.The event ended on April 1 and VP-47 buckled back down to finish out the last two months of a six month deployment, with a Bravo Zulu from the commodore, DESRON 50, under their belt.

During 2000 in Neon Falcon and Arabian Gauntlet, LAKE CHAMPLAIN improved interoperability and fostered good will with forces from Europe as well as Arabian Gulf coalition partners. USS Elliot (DD 967) was one of eight U.S. naval ships participating in Exercise Arabian Gauntlet 2000.

USS PAUL F. FOSTER (DD 964) departed for its eleventh deployment on January 27, 1999. While serving as part of the Pacific Middle East Force, PAUL F. FOSTER participated in OPERATION IRON SIREN, EAGER SENTRY, and ARABIAN GAUNTLET. In addition, the ship conducted boarding's in support of United Nations Sanctions against Iraq.

The Shipboard Deployable Surface Target (SDST) -- also known as "Roboski" -- provides an enhanced gunfire training capability against highly maneuverable, high speed surface targets. As such, Roboski offers an inexpensive, expendable target for Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection small arms training and supports 76mm, 5-inch/54caliber, and Phalanx CIWS training. SDST's are presently maintained by the Fleet Composite Squadron Six (VC-6), COMFIFTHFLT, COMSEVENTHFLT, and the Southern California Offshore Range Extension (SCORE) in support of COMTHIRDFLT. SDST was used for gunfire training in the Arabian Gauntlet exercise.